COURT FILE
NO.: 08-CV-347340 PDI
DATE:
20080704
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE -
ONTARIO
RE: ANTHONY ITALIANO, Applicant
TORONTO STANDARD CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION No. 1507,
Respondent
BEFORE: MADAM JUSTICE McWATT
COUNSEL: CAROL DIRKS, for the Applicant
JOHNATHAN FINE, for the Respondent
DATE HEARD: April 16, 2008
E N D O R S E M E N T
[1]
The Applicant asks for Orders pursuant to s. 45(1) of the
Arbitration Act granting leave to appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of
Justice from the Arbitral Award of Stephen R. Morrison dated January 3,
2008 and his later Arbitral Costs Award dated February 22, 2008. If leave
is granted, the Applicant then asks that the two awards be set aside
pursuant to s. 46(1) of the Arbitration Act.
[2]
The dispute between these two parties involves the enforcement
of two provisions of the Declaration and Rules of the Toronto Standard
Condominium Corporation (TSCC 1507) dealing with the creation of noise
from Mr. Italiano’s unit.
[3]
The condominium corporation has brought a Counter-Application
to enforce the two arbitral awards and, if necessary, an order validating
the registration of a certificate of lien on the title of Mr. Italiano’s
unit. The corporation asks to be able to enforce the certificate of lien
in the same manner as a mortgage, as provided by subsection 85(6) of the
Condominium Act, 1998.
The Factual Background
[4]
The Applicant is the owner of the condominium, suite 426 – 5
Marine Parade Drive, Toronto. He purchased the unit in October, 2006 and
moved into it in November, 2006. Prior to moving in, the Applicant got
permission from the Respondent corporation, who administers this high rise
condominium building, to install laminate hardwood flooring in the home.
[5]
Shortly after the Applicant moved into the unit, TSCC 1507
received complaints from owners of units 427 and 326 about noise coming
from Mr. Italiano’s unit.
[6]
TSCC 1507 issued two letters to the Applicant in November,
2006. The letters, however, were left with security and were never
delivered to Mr. Italiano.
[7]
In January, 2007, TSCC 1507 sent a further letter to the
Applicant – on paper and by email. Mr. Italiano and his father, John
Italiano, requested a meeting with the property manager as a result. The
Applicant’s father also asked to be contacted if there were any further
complaints. At that time, Mr. Italiano became aware of complaints from
his neighbor at unit 427, but was not informed of any complaints from
either the unit beneath him at 326 nor any other unit in the building.
[8]
From January to April, 2007, security from the building
attended at the Applicant’s unit several times in response to complaints
from unit 427. Two reports confirmed the sound from Mr. Italiano’s unit
to be “loud”.
[9]
The property manager did not contact the Applicant or his
father, but instead referred the matter to legal counsel for TSCC 1507 in
February, 2007. The corporation’s lawyer sent Mr. Italiano a letter with
a deadline to respond. Mr. Italiano’s father, John, requested a sound
transmission test, alleging inadequacies in the materials contained in the
walls between his son’s unit and the unit at 427. TSCC 1507 rejected this
request in March, 2007.
[10]
The matter was referred for mediation at the end of May, 2007.
Mr. Italiano did not attend due to advice given to him by legal counsel at
the time. The Applicant believed the mediation would be rescheduled to a
new date. However, by July 9, 2007, the Respondent company had submitted
the disagreement to arbitration seeking various orders against Mr.
Italiano. The hearing date was scheduled for July 30, 2007.
[11]
At issue were Article 4.2(d) of the Declaration dealing with
noise, odours or offensive action transmitted from one unit to another and
Rule 2 of the TSCC 1507 Rules which dealt with noise transmissions from
one unit to another. The corporation requested various orders against the
Applicant.
[12]
On July 30, 2007, the Applicant attended the arbitration
unrepresented by counsel. He asked for and was granted an adjournment to
hire a lawyer, but, as a result of the adjournment, he was ordered to pay
$4,000 in legal costs to the Respondent. Those costs have been paid.
[13]
The hearing was rescheduled for August 7, 2007 and commenced that
date with the Applicant represented by legal counsel. Counsel for the
Applicant requested another adjournment of the arbitration because he had
just been retained to act for Mr. Italiano. Counsel also advised the
arbitrator that Mr. Italiano was prepared to consent to a compliance
order, subject to the common element walls to the unit being tested, at
his own expense, to ascertain any deficiencies which might account for
excessive noise from his unit. TSCC 1507 rejected this request and
insisted that the arbitration proceed.
[14]
In September, 2007, Mr. Italiano applied to the arbitrator for
access to the common elements by way of entry into Units 427 and 326 to
have testing performed. The arbitrator instead ordered an independent
acoustical expert to report to him about the issue. The expert was paid
for by Mr. Italiano in the amount of $2100.00.
[15]
Mr. Italiano was not permitted to participate in the process. The
TSCC 1507 property manager gave access to the units to the expert and
provided instructions as to the areas to be tested.
[16]
The acoustics report was delivered to the arbitrator in November,
2007. It concluded that the sound transmission material installed in the
building did comply with the minimum Ontario Building Code standard,
although, barely.
[17]
The remainder of the arbitration hearing was completed over a day
and a half ending on December 12, 2007. On January 3, 2008, the
arbitrator found the following facts:
1.
The respondent’s unit had been a frequent source of noise that
was annoying, disruptive and constituted a nuisance to other occupants in
the building;
2.
there was overwhelming evidence that Mr. Italiano’s unit was a
frequent source of unacceptable noise generated at all hours of the night
and day in total and callous disregard for the welfare of others;
3.
every reasonable effort was made to encourage and compel Mr.
Italiano to comply with the Declaration and Rules regarding noise before
resorting to the extreme and expensive measure of insituting the
arbitration proceeding;
4.
property management did make every reasonable effort to bring
the issue to Mr. Italiano’s attention and to make useful suggestions as to
how it might be resolved.
[18]
With respect to the remedy sought by TSCC 1507, the arbitrator
found the following:
Counsel for the condominium corporation set out ten specific requested
terms. I have no difficulty with respect to the first and last of those
terms in light of my findings. The first is a declaration that the
respondent has breached section 4.2(d) of the Declaration and Rules 2(a)
and (b). The last is an order that the respondent pay the applicant’s
costs on a substantial indemnity basis and the full costs of the
arbitration, and that such costs be collectible in the same manner as
common expenses. I find this request to be completely consistent with the
terms of the Declaration, the Rules, the mediation and arbitration bylaw
(By-law #3) adopted by the Corporation on July 24, 2006, which, in
paragraph 28 thereof, incorporates by reference the provisions of section
134(5) of the Act, and my powers under the Arbitration Act, 1991. Given
the clear wording and intent of the condominium corporation’s constating
documents in this regard, all of which were accepted by the respondent
when he purchased his unit, I see no reason for the other unit owners to
bear any cost burden whatsoever arising out of the corporation’s
enforcement efforts.
Even if I were not obliged to make a costs award on this basis by the
terms of those governing documents, I would nonetheless be inclined to do
so, given the respondent’s pattern of behavior with respect to this series
of complaints and the resulting proceedings. In my opinion, these
proceedings were entirely unnecessary, but for the respondent’s
indifference and refusal to meaningfully participate in any of the earlier
efforts to deal with the problem, including the scheduled mediation. As
Mr. Italiano said during his testimony with respect to the towing of his
vehicle, “I had to learn the hard way”. Regrettably, the imposition of
this costs award is one more apparently necessary lesson for Mr. Italiano.
Although I do not know the precise amount of the costs incurred by the
condominium corporation to date, I rather suspect that, when it is
combined with the full costs of the arbitration itself and his own legal
costs, this aspect of my award will have a more salutary impact of Mr.
Italiano’s future behaviour than any other term.
[19]
He then went on to conclude the following:
Accordingly, my award
will be restricted to the following two items:
(a)
a declaration that the respondent has breached sections
4(1)(a) and (b) and 4(2) (d) of the Declaration and Rules 2(a) and (b);
(b)
an order that the respondent comply with sections
4(1)(a) and (b) and 4(2)(d) of the Declaration and Rules 2(a) and (b);
(c)
an order that the respondent pay the applicant’s costs
on a substantial indemnity basis and the full costs of the arbitration.
If such costs are not paid with fifteen days of them being tendered to the
respondent through his legal counsel, the condominium corporation shall
pay the full costs of the arbitration and those costs, together with it’s
own costs shall be collectible in the same manner as common expenses.
If the parties are
unable to agree on the quantum of the claimant’s costs, I will receive
written submissions with respect thereto, within 30 days of the release of
this award. I also draw counsel’s attention to section 44 of the
Arbitration Act, 1991 and invite any appropriate submissions,
with the same 30-day period.
[20]
The arbitrator’s award with respect of both the scale and the
enforceability of the costs (as being collectible in the same manner as
common expenses by the registration of a lien on Mr. Italiano’s unit) was
made without allowing submissions by counsel for Mr. Italiano. The award
was also made without giving any consideration to Offers to Settle which
were exchanged between the parties in the course of the proceeding.
[21]
On January 18, 2007, the Notice of Application in these
proceedings was filed. On January 22, 2007, counsel for TSCC 1507 wrote
to the arbitrator and sought to make submissions on the issue of costs,
including with respect to matters which had already been determined by the
arbitrator and which were the subject of the Notice of Application filed
with the Superior Court.
[22]
Despite objections from counsel for Mr. Italiano, counsel for TSCC
1507 delivered submissions to the arbitrator on all issues. Counsel for
Mr. Italiano took the position that the arbitrator was functus. The
arbitrator ruled that he was functus with respect to the award and scale
of costs ordered. He ruled that he was not functus in respect of the
quantum of costs and requested submissions on that point.
[23]
The Applicant’s counsel did not make submissions to the
arbitrator, maintaining that the arbitrator was functus on all issues
relating to costs.
[24]
TSCC 1507 claimed costs of the proceeding in the amount of
$62,948.43, which included 75 hours of senior legal counsel’s time at
$450.00 per hour. The total amount of fees claimed was $48,919.98 (less
$4,000.00 previously paid by Mr. Italiano).
[25]
The total fees charged by the arbitrator was $35,815.19.
[26]
On February 22, 2008, the Arbitrator released the Arbitral Costs
Award after receiving submissions from the corporation’s counsel on the
issue of quantum. It provided that:
In summary, I order the respondent to pay forthwith the following amounts
to the claimant condominium corporation:
|
Balance of Legal
fees |
$39,000.00 |
|
Disbursements |
$ 7,049.88 |
|
Arbitrator’s Fees |
$35,815.19 |
|
Total |
$81,865.07 |
The Application
Analysis
[27]
Under the Arbitration Act, 1991, appeal rights from an arbitral
award are limited. Section 45(1) of that Act sets out a three part
conjunctive test for obtaining leave to appeal an award:
45(1) If the arbitration agreement does not deal with appeals on
questions of law, a party may appeal an award to the court on a question
of law with leave, which the court shall grant only if it is satisfied
that,
a)
the importance to the parties of the matters at stake in
the arbitration justifies an appeal; and
b)
determination of the question of law at issue will
significantly affect the rights of the parties.
[28]
The arbitration agreement in this matter does not deal with
appeals on questions of law and does not provide a party the opportunity
to appeal an award on a question of law, a question of fact or of mixed
law and fact. Therefore, the Applicant needs the leave of this court to
appeal the awards.
The Grounds of the Appeal
1.
The Arbitrator Erred In Law in His Interpretation of Article
4.2(d) of the Declaration and Rule 2 of the Rules of TSCC 1507 And In the
Application of A Subjective Standard, As Opposed To Objective, In
Determining Whether A Noise of Offensive Action Is An Annoyance And/Or
Nuisance And / Or Disruptive.
[29]
Section 4.2(d) of the Condominium Corporation’s Declaration
provides that:
In
the event the Board determines in its sole and absolute discretion that
any noise … is being transmitted to another Unit …
Rule
2(a) of the Rules of TSCC 1507 states:
Owners … shall not create nor permit the creation or continuation of any
noise or nuisance which, in the opinion of the Board or Manager, may or
does disturb the comfort or quiet enjoyment of the Units or Common
Elements ..
Rule
2(b) states:
If
the Board determines that any noise is being transmitted to another Unit …
[30]
This ground of appeal does not deal with a question of law, but
rather with a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law. In
his decision, the arbitrator recognized that the board of directors and
the manager had the discretion to determine whether noise was being
transmitted from one unit to the other. He also recognized, however, that
the discretion must be exercised reasonably by taking all the evidence
into consideration.
[31]
The arbitrator did not err in law in his interpretation of the
noise provisions. First, there is no established principle in law
dictating the interpretation of these types of noise provisions in a
condominium’s governing documents. Second, when he did interpret the
particular noise provisions to the facts of this case, he did so as a
question of fact or mixed law and fact.
[32]
The arbitrator did not determine (nor was he asked to do so) a
threshold of noise which would qualify as a breach of the declaration and
rules of TSCC 1507. He, instead, applied common sense based on reason and
the wording of the TSCC 1507’s declaration, by-laws and rules to the facts
of this case. He did so correctly, in my view.
[33]
The arbitrator also found that the condominium corporation and its
manager made every reasonable effort to solve the problems they had with
Mr. Italiano. That, coupled with the strong evidence that the Applicant
had breached the noise provisions of the declaration and rules, leaves me
with no other conclusion than that his decision was sound and without
error.
[34]
For the reasons stated, I would not grant leave to appeal, but
would also not allow an appeal had leave been granted.
2.
The Arbitrator Erred In Law In Interpreting The Responsibilities
of The Board of Directors And Property Management In Respect of the
Enforcement of Article 4.2(d) Of The Declaration and Rule 2 Of The Rules
of TSCC 1507.
[35]
This is ground of appeal relates to a question of mixed
fact and law. It deals with the Arbitrator’s findings of fact about the
noise emanating from the Applicants’ unit, the reasonableness of the
actions of the board of directors and property manager, the suggestions as
to noise abatement techniques in the letters sent to the Applicant by the
corporation and the finding by the arbitrator that the Applicant did not
do enough to abate the noise.
[36]
Leave to appeal is denied.
[37]
In any event, this ground of appeal has no merit. Pursuant
to the Condominium Act, 1998 and the TSCC 1507’s declaration and
rules, the obligation to comply and do whatever is necessary to prevent
disturbing noises was Mr. Italiano’s. As the Respondent has pointed out
in its submissions, it was not up to the condominium corporation to show
Mr. Italiano how to do this.
3.
The Arbitrator Erred In Law In Failing to Consider Evidence of Efforts
Made By The Applicant to Abate Any Noise From The Unit.
[38]
This issue does not relate to any error in law. The Arbitrator
considered the Applicant’s evidence on this issue and found that whatever
the Applicant did was insufficient to prevent annoying and disruptive
noise from being transmitted from his unit.
4.
The Arbitrator Erred In Law In making an Order Requiring Italiano To
Pay The Substantial Indemnity Costs of TSCC 1507 And Full Costs Of The
Arbitraiton, And In The Absence of Allowing Italiano to Make Proper
Submissions In Respect of That Issue.
[39]
The Applicant alleges a denial of natural justice in the
arbitrator’s award of costs on a substantial indemnity basis and without
hearing submissions on the issue by the Applicant. This procedural
irregularity is reviewable as a matter of law. Pursuant to section
45(1)(a) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, this issue is an important
one regarding the matters at stake in the arbitration and justifies that
leave be granted to appeal because of the substantial amount of costs
awarded against the Applicant. Leave is granted, but the ground of appeal
should be dismissed for the following reasons.
[40]
The Arbitrator has the power to award costs pursuant to the
Arbitration Act, 199. Section 54 (1) and (2) set out:
54.(1) An arbitral tribunal may award the costs of an arbitration.
(2) The costs of arbitration consist of parties’ legal expenses, fees and
expenses of the arbitral tribunal and any other expenses related to the
arbitration.
[41]
The Arbitrator is given discretion pursuant to this section to
decide who must pay costs to whom. That discretion must be exercised
judicially and not irrationally or whimsically (AWS Engineers &
Planners Corp. v. Deep River (Town) 2006 Carswell Ont. 3320, par. 11).
[42]
In the AWS case, the court paralleled the powers of an arbitrator
under section 54 to those of an arbitration board, not limited by factors
under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for a court’s exercise of
discretion. AWS further described the board’s discretion as follows:
The statute establishing and empowering the board gave it complete
discretion to order costs of and incidental to proceedings before it.
Chief Justice Furlong [in Newfoundland] went on to add;
“the discretion of the Board is unlimited so long as that discretion is
properly exercised in law and we are in no position to interfere with it.”
[43]
It is within an arbitrator’s discretion to order full indemnity if
it is justified after looking at the prior conduct of a party when making
such an award (Rosenfeld v. Iamgold International African Mining Gold
Corp. 1997 CarswellOnt 3676).
[44]
In this case, the arbitrator acted in accordance with s. 134(5) of
the Condominium Act, 1998 when he ordered costs payable by the
Applicant on a substantial indemnity basis and added them to the common
expenses to be collectible as such (Metropolitan Toronto Condominium
Corp. No. 1385 v. Skyline Executive Properties Inc. (2005) 253 O.L.R.
(4th) 656 (Ont.C.A.) at par. 160).
[45]
There was no denial of natural justice to the Applicant in this
case. While not taking submissions from the Applicant before deciding the
issues of scale and quantum of costs of the arbitration and enforcing the
collection of costs by allowing them to be collected as common expenses,
the arbitrator later gave the applicant opportunites (except in relation
to the scale of costs) to make submissions.
[46]
Section 44 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 permits an arbitrator, on
his own initiative or at a party’s request, to amend the award so as to
correct an injustice caused by an oversight by an arbitrator.
[47]
After having asked for submissions from counsel on the outstanding
issues on costs, the arbitrator’s release of his award prior to
considering those submissions was an oversight. This is clear because,
after having been notified by the condominium corporation’s lawyer of the
irregularity, the arbitrator asked the Applicant on two occasions to
present those costs submissions to him. The Applicant declined to do so,
taking the position that the arbitrator was functus.
[48]
In fact, the arbitrator had agreed that he was functus on the
issue of the scale of costs to be awarded, but was open to reconsider his
award on the issues of quantum of costs and their enforcement by way of
payment as common expenses. I agree with him that he was not functus on
those issues (Finlay Forest Industries v. I.W.A. Local 1-424
1975 CarswellBC 155).
[49]
The Applicant’s counsel had an opportunity to present submissions
on costs and chose not to do so. The arbitrator’s decision to proceed to
a final decision without the Applicant’s participation, once he chose not
to deliver the invited submissions, was not inappropriate (Environment
Export International of Canada Inc. v. Success International Inc.,
1995 CarswellOnt 2485).
[50]
The arbitrator was also not incorrect for not inviting costs
submissions on the issue of the scale of costs. I have previously
outlined the basis for his discretion to award substantial indemnity costs
from the Applicant, but would add that pursuant to s. 134(5) of the
Condominium Act, 1998, TSCC 1507’s declaration, mediation/arbitration
By-law No. 3 and rules, and the Ontario Court of Appeal’s decision in
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 1385 v. Skyline (supra),
he was bound to order such costs. An award for substantial indemnity
costs would have been ordered even had the Applicant had made submissions
– especially in light of the particular facts of this case.
[51]
The Applicant complains that the arbitral costs award was made
without any consideration, by the arbitrator, of offers to settle made by
the parties. At the same time, the Applicant failed to respond to the
arbitrator’s request for submissions on costs. The arbitrator can hardly
be faulted for not considering any offers to settle made by the parties if
he was not made award of them.
[52]
This ground of appeal is dismissed.
5.
The Arbitrator Erred In Law In Making An Order That The Cost
Award Payable By The Applicant Is To Be A Common Expense and Enforceable
As Such By Registration Of A Certificate of Lien On the Applicant’s Unit
Pursuant to Section 134(5) of The Condominium Act, 1998, By Law No. 3 And
The Declaration of TSCC 1507, And In The Absence of Allowing Italiano To
Make Submissions In Respect of That Issue.
[53]
I have already ruled that the Applicant has no valid complaint
about the arbitral costs award in the face of his refusal to provide
submissions to the arbitrator. That ruling also applies to this issue.
[54]
In addition, I have found that the arbitrator made no reviewable
error in awarding substantial indemnity costs in this case after
considering the legislation, governing documents of the Respondent
corporation and the Applicants’ behavior.
[55]
The arbitrator’s decision to make the costs ordered collectible as
common expenses and enforce the collection of costs by allowing the
condominium to register a certificate of lien on the unit pursuant to s.
134(5) of the Condominium Act, 1998 and the condominium’s
declaration and rules is an issue of law and reviewable by this court.
[56]
Leave to appeal is granted pursuant to subsection 45(1)(a) and (b)
of the Arbitration Act, 1991. Not only is the issue important to
the parties, but Mr. Italiano’s rights relating to his ownership of the
condominium are significantly affected by this issue.
[57]
Regretfully, this ground of the appeal must fail.
[58]
Any order as to costs are collectible as common expenses pursuant
to s. 134(5) of The Condominium Act, 1998. The case of Skyline
(supra) affirms the notion that the financial burden associated with
obtaining a compliance order should shift from the “innocent” condominium
corporation and owners to the “guilty” unit owner who necessitated the
obtaining of the compliance order.
[59]
The case of York Condominium Corp. No. 482 v. Christiansen,
2003 CarswellOnt 6533, advanced the notion that the unit owners’
contributions to the common expenses were the life blood of the
condominium corporation and, as such, the legislature has provided means
whereby these corporations are assured of collecting such contributions,
along with interest and reasonable legal and other costs incurred in such
collection.
[60]
The parties disagree about whether s. 134(5) of the Condominium
Act, 1998 applied to the arbitrator’s cost award. The arbitrator did
not explicitly state that section 134(5) applied to the costs award. He
simply stated that s. 134(5) was incorporated into paragraph 28 of By-law
#3 of the corporation. Both parties agree that this provision applies to
the arbitrator’s fees. The Applicant submits that the subsection does not
apply to costs in favour of a party.
[61]
I would tend to agree with the Applicant that s. 134(5), in and of
itself, only applies to costs associated with compliance orders granted by
courts and not arbitral tribunals. This principle was recognized in
Metropolitan Toronto Corp. No. 1385 v. Skyline, (supra) at par.
35. Justice Doherty makes it clear, in that case, that
“section 134(5), the section in issue here, applies only to condominium
corporations and only where the condominium corporation has obtained an
award of damages or costs under s. 134(3)”.
[62]
Section 134(3) does refer to an application to “the court”.
Justice Doherty’s reasoning in Skyline supports the proposition that
subsection 134(5) cannot be interpreted separately from the other
subsections of section 134 and that the section created a procedure for
obtaining compliance orders from the Superior Court of Justice.
[63]
This view is also endorsed by the authors of the book
Condominiums in Ontario: A Practical Analysis of the New Legislation
[Harry Herskowitz & Mark F. Freeman. Toronto: LSUC & OBA 2001] at
466-67.
[64]
Nonetheless, I conclude that the arbitrator was correct in his
finding that the TSCC 1507 was authorized to have the mediation and
arbitration costs collected in the same manner as common expenses.
Section 4.2(d) of the condominium’s declaration provides that
In the event that the Owner of such Residential Unit fails to abate the
noise, the Board shall take such steps as shall be necessary to abate the
noise … and the Owner shall be liable to the corporation for all expenses
incurred by the Corporation in abating the noise, which expenses are to
include reasonable solicitor’s fees on a solicitor and his or her own
client basis and shall be deemed to be additional contributions to Common
Expenses and recoverable as such.
[65]
Mr. Italiano, pursuant to section 119(1) of the Condominium Act,
1998, is statutorily bound to abide by his condominium’s declaration.
[66]
Common expenses are defined in s. 1(1) of the Condominium Act
as “the expenses related to the performance of the objects and duties of a
corporation and all expenses specified as common expenses in this Act or
in a declaration.” Therefore, common expenses can be created in three
ways:
1.
they are specified in the Condominium Act
2.
they are specified in the condominium’s declaration or
3.
they are related to the performance of the objects and duties of
a corporation.
[67]
Costs obtained in arbitral proceedings are not specified as common
expenses in the Act. However, it is clear from s. 1(1) that a
corporation is allowed to designate what common expenses it can charge to
unit owners in its declaration. Is this power to designate common
expenses restricted? Section 72(d) of the Act states that a
declaration must contain “a statement of the proportions, expressed in
percentages allocated to the units, in which the owners are to contribute
to the common expenses.” However, the condominium corporation is also
empowered to collect common expenses that are not specified as percentages
pursuant to s. 7(4)(a) which states that a declaration may contain “a
statement specifying the common expenses of the corporation.” The only
restriction to the corporation’s power to collect certain costs as common
expenses seems to be section 7(5) which sets out that “If any provision in
a declaration is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the
provisions of this Act prevail and the declaration shall be deemed to be
amended accordingly.” I do not believe that the Articles 4.2(d) or 6.1
are inconsistent with the Condominium Act. Therefore, it seems to
me that a corporation can collect an arbitral costs award in the same
manner as common expenses if they are so specified in the declaration.
This would allow it to register a lien, pursuant to s. 85(1), for unpaid
common expenses.
[68]
Pursuant to that provision, the owner is liable to the corporation
“for all expenses incurred in abating the noise,” including its legal fees
on a solicitor and his or her own client basis (which is usually held to
mean full indemnity) and presumably its costs of arbitration. These
expenses would be deemed to be additional contributions to common expenses
and recoverable as such.
[69]
The arbitrator did not err when he found that the corporation’s
declaration authorized the collection of the Respondent’s costs and the
costs of the arbitration were collectible in the same manner as common
expenses.
[70]
In authorizing the collection of the respondent’s costs in the
same manner as common expenses, the arbitrator also relied on paragraph 28
of By-law #3. It states:
“The arbitrator’s fees for assisting the parties with the disagreement,
and other associated costs, such as but not limited to court reporters’
fees, shall be split equally between the parties, unless otherwise agreed,
as between the parties or ordered by the arbitrator, but the Corporation
shall be primarily responsible for paying the arbitrator’s account. The
other party or parties, regardless of whether an owner or a tenant, shall
reimburse the Corporation within seven days of a written request for
reimbursement, failing which, the default in payment shall be deemed to be
an award of costs pursuant to section 134(5) of the Act.”
[71]
Because of my earlier conclusion that s. 134(5) of the Act only
applies to court orders, I do not think the arbitrator is correct in
relying on para. 28 in awarding costs. However due to the fact that this
paragraph only deals with the costs of the arbitration and the arbitrator
did not rely solely on this paragraph in awarding his costs to be
collectible as common expenses, this error is of no consequence.
6.
The Arbitrator Erred in Law In Making An Order For The Amount Of
Substantial Indemnity Costs Which He Did, Which Cost Award Fails to Bear
Reasonable Connection to The Amount Reasonably Contemplated.
[72]
This issue does not raise a question of law. In any event, the
Applicant intended to mount a full defence to the condominium
corporation’s case. He was represented by counsel in that regard. He was
ordered to pay costs of $4,000 on July 30, 2007 for not being prepared to
proceed. The arbitration itself took four days along with a motion with
cross-examinations. There were concerns raised at the arbitration by TSCC
regarding the mounting costs for continuing the hearing. The Applicant
lost the arbitration and should bear the costs of proceeding with it, -
especially in light of the fact that he could have kept the noise down in
his unit and avoided what has taken place in this matter.
7. The Arbitrator Erred In Law In Awarding Costs To TSCC 1507 Which
Precede The Arbitration Proceedings
[73]
I agree with the Applicant that what constitutes arbitral costs is
set out in section 54 of the Arbitration Act, 1991 c. 17 as the
following:
54.(1) An Arbitral tribunal may award costs of an arbitration.
(2)
the costs of an arbitration consist of the parties’ legal expenses, the
fees and expenses of the arbitral tribunal and any other expenses related
to the arbitration.
[74]
I also agree with the applicant that the arbitrator erred in law
by ordering costs to TSCC 1507 which preceded the delivery of the Notice
of Arbitration by TSCC 1507 in accordance with its By-law No. 3.
[75]
Although the arbitrator found that the mediation was a condition
precedent to the commencement of the arbitration and the mediation was
“related to the arbitration” pursuant to section 132 of the Condominium
Act, 1998, he had no jurisdiction to order the Applicant to pay the
$4,102.50 mediation costs as costs of the arbitration.
[76]
First, Section 132(6)(b) of the Condominium Act, 1998
specifies that
132(6) Each party shall pay the share of the mediator’s fees and expenses
that
(b)
the mediator specifies in the notice stating that the mediation has
failed, if the mediation fails.
[77]
The mediation did not continue after it was adjourned due to the
Applicant’s failure to attend. There was no “failure” of the mediation
pursuant to s. 132(6)(b) of the Act.
[78]
Second, paragraph 10 of the corporation’s By-Law no. 3 (Mediation
and Arbitration Agreement) states that the mediator’s fees for assisting
the parties shall be borne equally by the parties unless the mediator
specifies otherwise.
[79]
In Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 1385 v. Skyline
Executive Properties Inc. (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 3330 (S.C.J.) at
par. 31 reversed on other grounds (2005), 253 O.L.R. (4TH) 656
(Ont. C.A.)], Justice Lax held:
“it [the legislature] left the determination of the payment of the
mediator’s fees and expenses to the mediator under section 132(6), who
specifies the amount each party will pay. Where mediation fails to obtain
a settlement, the parties are required to arbitrate under the Arbitration
Act, 1991. Presumably, the arbitrator will determine how the parties will
share in payment of these fees and whether to award costs of the
arbitration to either party”.
[80]
Leave to appeal is granted and the application granted on this
ground. The $4,102.50 will be deducted from the total of the costs
awarded by the arbitrator. The award then becomes $77,762.57.
[81]
On all other grounds except the seventh and last ground, the
Application is dismissed.
Counter-Application
[82]
In the circumstances, the counter-application is granted. The
Costs Award, dated February 22, 2008 ordered the Applicant to pay
$81,865.07 to TSCC 1507. Any amount which remained unpaid 30 days from
the date of the Arbitral Costs Award were to be recovered by TSCC 1507 as
common expenses. No payments have been made by the Applicant pursuant to
the Arbitration Award.
[83]
On March 25, 2008, 32 days after the date of the award, a Notice
of Lien was sent to the Applicant pursuant to section 85(4) of the
Condominium Act, 1998 advising him that a certificate of lien would be
registered on title if payment for the total amount owing plus interest
was not received by April 7, 2008. No payments were made by the
Applicant.
[84]
A Certificate of Lien was registered on title to the Applicant’s
Unit pursuant to s. 85 of the Condominium Act, 1998. The total
amount of the lien will be $77,762.57.
[85]
Submissions on Costs of the Application shall be made in writing
to me within the next 14 days. Those submissions shall be no longer than
3 pages in length excluding any Bill of Costs.
___________________________
McWatt J.
DATE:
July 4, 2008